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THE EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT: ITS
HISTORY AND A CRITIQUE ON THE GROUNDS OF
TEXT, RIGHTS, NEGATIVE LIBERTY, AND OUR
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
ZACHARY C. LARSEN*
This article articulates the growing tendency of constitutional theorists
and U.S. Supreme Court justices to construe the First Amendment in
the light of egalitarian principles and argues that to do so is inconsis-
tent with the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment. The arti-
cle criticizes the egalitarian approach as creating a positive right,
contrary to the structure of the Bill of Rights as a "charter of negative
liberties" and as diluting the right to speech by infusing in it a relative
determination of speech values. Finally, the article concludes that the
egalitarian reading should be rejected as endangering the very liber-
ties the First Amendment creates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Were there an "Equality Clause" tacked onto the First Amend-
ment's Speech Clause, it would most likely read as follows: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
except where doing so is necessary to preserving the greater goal of
egalitarian democracy."1 On the basis of such a clause, Congress
could be justified in legislating that muting some voices is necessary to
the creation of a forum that gives an ear proportionally to all view-
* Law Clerk to Hon. Calvin Osterhaven; J.D. Magna Cum Laude, Ave Maria School of
Law 2008; B.A. Magna Cur Laude, Washington State University 2005. I am grateful to my wife
Andrea, without whom this article would not have been published, for persistently speaking
encouragement to me and for awakening my imagination to bigger dreams. Gratitude is also
extended to my family, to the many great faculty members who served me at Ave Maria and
made their mark on this article, including John Dudley, Fr. Joseph Isanga, Richard Myers, Phillip
Pucillo, and Lee Strang, and to the editors of the North Carolina Central Law Review for their
assistance and professionalism during our dealings. Lastly, I thank the Giver of All Good Gifts
for this opportunity.
1. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 48 (2005) ("[B]asic democratic objectives, in-
cluding some of a kind that the First Amendment seeks to further, lie on both terms of the
constitutional equation. Seen in terms of modern liberty, they include protection of the citizen's
speech from government interference; seen in terms of active liberty, they include promotion of
a democratic conversation."); see also CAss SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL].
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points.2 As a means to such ends, the government could render com-
pulsory the exposure of citizens to ideas they consider repugnant, 3 and
media owners might be compelled to succumb to government regula-
tion of content.4 No such laws would violate the Speech Clause of the
First Amendment as, of course, the Equality Clause would modify
that provision to permit these restrictions on the reasoning that the
restrictions are necessary to promote a greater goal than simply free
speech-actually free speech.
To the chagrin of many theorists and even a number of Supreme
Court Justices,5 the First Amendment lacks such a qualification. In-
stead of granting a positive liberty to share the nation's collective ear
equally with every other citizen, the clause conforms to the structure
and nature adopted by the rest of the Bill of Rights-granting a free-
dom by limiting the power of government to act.6 It is in this manner
that the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence charges
that the clause requires "commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"7 and ad-
monishes to let "speech rebut speech"8 rather than to restrict one per-
son's ideas for the sake of another.
Despite the absence of a textual qualification to the Speech Clause
on egalitarian grounds and the inconsistency of such an approach with
the Court's overall Speech Clause jurisprudence, the idea of an im-
plicit Equality Clause is often advocated and has accumulated a
stronger following over time. This reading of the First Amendment
creates a positive right to speech, backed and guaranteed by the gov-
ernment and requires government intervention in and balancing of
speech in order to ensure private citizens the enjoyment of that right.
It is the intention of this paper to offer a brief explanation of the
Equality Clause as it has developed in Supreme Court jurisprudence,
2. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 1; CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE].
3. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (arguing against "the growing power of con-
sumers to filter what they see" and stating that "a well-functioning system of free expression"
requires that "people should be exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in ad-
vance.") [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC].
4. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 107 (1993)
("[I]nsofar as newspapers invoke the civil and criminal law to prevent people from reaching the
public, they too might be subject to mild forms of regulation without abridging the freedom of
speech.") [hereinafter SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY].
5. See BREYER, supra note 1.
6. New York Tunes v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)
("[Tihe new powers granted to a central government might be interpreted to permit the govern-
ment to curtail [various freedoms] .... The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the
general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in
the original Constitution.") (emphasis in original).
7. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
8. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
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followed by a critique that aims at dispelling the ostensible wisdom of
egalitarian approaches to the First Amendment. The grounds for cri-
tique have been partially disclosed in the foregoing introduction and
rely upon the concept that our constitutional freedoms are negative
liberties, the structure of our government as requiring republicanism
and not egalitarian democracy, and, to a lesser extent, the nature of
rights as absolutes.
The first section of this paper endeavors to adumbrate a history of
the Equality Clause in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence as well as in
constitutional theory. The second section addresses the normative ap-
peal of an equality addendum. The third and final section will take
issue with the Equality Clause on the separate grounds of its inconsis-
tency with the Bill of Rights as a listing of negative liberties, its incon-
sistency with the republican form of government outlined by the
Constitution, and its inconsistency with the theory of rights as non-
derogable9 trumps, concluding not only that such a reading is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment as written and understood but also
that they are inapposite to the ideal structure for protecting our
liberties.
II. BIRTHING THE EQUALITY CLAUSE
The Equality Clause, or egalitarian reading, of the First Amend-
ment has its roots both in constitutional theory and in the body of
several, primarily dissenting, opinions of the Supreme Court. Because
it represents an implemented approach of jurists rather than the mus-
ings of academics, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence will be dis-
cussed first. The academic discourse, however, is expressed with less
of a veiling and therefore is also important to the discussion and will
succeed the account of the Supreme Court's journey. Combined, the
two represent a growing egalitarian approach to the First Amendment
that both threatens to irreparably corrupt that fundamental freedom
and skews the purpose and meaning of the constitutional text.
A. An Egalitarian Reading by the Court
The egalitarian reading has been invoked in diverse areas of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence including incite-
ment, freedom from speech compulsions, and campaign finance re-
form. Largely, this reading has been rejected, having been advocated
only by the Court's dissenters or discussed but not adopted by the
9. The term "non-derogable" is commonly used in human rights speech to refer to rights
from which no derogation may be had. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (specifically, Article IV
stating that "no derogation" from certain rights-giving provisions may be made).
2009]
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majority opinions. The following sketch does not intend to cover this
area exhaustively but instead offers an outline of some of the more
important decisions of the Court that implicate this ideology.
i. Holmes in Schenck and Debs Compared to Abrams
The injection of egalitarianism into Speech Clause jurisprudence
has its roots in the opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. from some
of the earliest and most profoundly important free speech cases,
Schenck,' ° Debs," and Abrams." The contrast of Holmes' opinions in
these cases betrays the underlying philosophy that has gained promi-
nence in contemporary constitutional interpretation and which this
paper critiques. It is important to note that these cases were not
"early" at all in the history of our Constitution, being handed down
successively in 1919, nearly 130 years after the Constitution's framing.
In each of the cases, men espousing Socialist beliefs were criminally
indicted under the Espionage Act after engaging in efforts, via print
or public speech, to recruit actors to their cause. The men challenged
those convictions on First Amendment grounds. The Espionage Act
survived the attack in all three circumstances, the majority opinions
differing primarily by their authorship. Writing for the majority in
both Schenck and Debs, the revered Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. voted to uphold the statute against the challenges based upon the
"clear and present danger" presented by the speech. 3 In Schenck, the
Socialist party general secretary was charged under the Espionage Act
for circulating pamphlets decrying the Conscription Act as unconstitu-
tional and arguing for men to resist the draft." Holmes concluded that
the appellee's words had been akin to "falsely shouting fire in a
crowded theater and causing a panic"' 5 and were consequently unpro-
tected. In Debs, after finding that the "natural and intended effect" of
Socialist party leader Eugene Debs' speech was to "obstruct recruit-
ing,"" Holmes disposed of Debs by citing Schenck.17 Similarly, the
majority in Abrams-written by Justice John Clarke-upheld the con-
viction of the pamphlet-distributing Socialists who had written to urge
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
11. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
13. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53; Debs, 249 U.S. at 217.
14. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49, 50-51. Schenck's document recited the Thirteenth Amendment,
saying that the idea embodied was violated by conscription, that a conscript was little better than
a convict, and urging men to "assert [their] rights" by resisting the draft. Id.
15. Id. at 52.
16. Debs, 249 U.S. at 214.
17. Id. at 215 ("The chief defences upon. which the defendant seemed willing to rely [in-
cluded] . . . that based upon the First Amendment ... disposed of in Schenck.").
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workers in factories; which produced bullets, bayonets, and other ve-
hicles of war; to walk off the job.18
The striking difference between Abrams and the previous two cases
was not the majority opinions but was Justice Holmes' dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Justice Louis Brandeis.19 Holmes belittled
the characterization of the defendants' conduct in Abrams as not
presenting anything remotely justifying the abridgment of speech. °
The central distinguishing aspect of the case appeared to be Holmes'
statement that "nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger" to the government. 21 Holmes went on to trivialize
the defendants as "poor and puny anonymities, '2 2 in arguing for the
protected nature of their speech, stating that "[t]o allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent[.] ' 23
Holmes' opinion was just that-that the speech was impotent, or more
precisely that the speakers were.
Whereas Holmes' two majority opinions refused to offer protection
for the Socialist party presidential candidate or the party's general
secretary, Holmes' dissent in Abrams reasoned that the two "poor and
puny anonymities '24 were deserving of protection, as if by virtue of
the fact that their speech was unlikely to garner an audience. The im-
potence of the speakers was cause enough for Holmes to find that it
deserved a voice. As Harry Kalven has noted, "[I]t seems that
Abrams moved Holmes because he was so trivial a critic[;] Debs
should have moved him because he was such an important one. '25 In
that respect, Holmes' Abrams dissent foreshadowed the arguments of
scholars and justices alike that would come later, in the principle that
muffled voices deserved a megaphone and louder ones may be muf-
fled, in a leveling of the field.
ii. Compulsory Equal Airtime and Market Regulations
The egalitarian reading next prominently reappeared in two cases
involving public media outlets that followed relatively closely upon
one another. In the first, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,26 the
18. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624.
19. Id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 626 ("No argument seems to me necessary to show that these pronunciamentos in
no way attack the form of government of the United States .....
21. Id. at 628.
22. Id. at 629.
23. Id. at 630.
24. Id. at 629.
25. HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA, 143
(1988).
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
2009]
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Court considered whether the "fairness doctrine"-a Federal Com-
munication Commission (FCC) regulation requiring broadcasters to
permit responsive airtime to controversial issues that the stations dis-
cussed in political editorial-could withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.
The appellant, Red Lion Broadcasting Company, had aired a
broadcast in which a guest speaker accused the author of a political
commentary of having been fired for making false accusations against
public officials, working for a Communist-affiliated publication, and
writing the book as a smear tactic.27 The appellee, the commentary's
author, complained to the FCC that he had been attacked and re-
quested airtime on the station to rebut these allegations.2 8 The FCC
agreed with the appellee and declared that Red Lion had failed to
meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine, and needed to provide
the appellee with airtime, whether he paid for it or not. 9 Red Lion
responded by alleging that its First Amendment rights had been vio-
lated.30 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the scarcity of
frequencies and radio broadcasting abilities necessitated the fairness
doctrine.31 The Court held that "the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters . . . is paramount. '32 Hearkening
back to the marketplace analogy, Justice White stated for the majority
that the purpose of the First Amendment is "to preserve an uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market. . . ."I'
The Court's decision in Red Lion may be explained in many re-
spects by the government's positive involvement in the speech result-
ing from the nature of licensing.34 Nevertheless, Justice White's
repugnance to permitting monopolies alluded to a species of enforced
equality and foreshadowed the "market regulation" suggestion that
has gained popularity in the time since Red Lion.35 Shortly thereafter,
27. Id. at 371.
28. Id. at 371-72.
29. Id. at 372.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 387.
32. Id. at 390.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
35. The fairness doctrine has been abolished by the FCC since this case. In re Complaint of
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R 5043 (1988). Though Congress attempted to reintroduce it in
2005 as the Fairness and Accountability in Broadcasting Act, it did not succeed. H.R. 501, 109th
Cong. (2005). Moreover, an opposing faction of senators has since grown and introduced their
own Broadcaster Freedom Act in June 2007, which would have forbidden the FCC from ever
repromulgating the fairness doctrine, if passed. H.R. 2905, 110th Cong. (2007).
6
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol31/iss2/3
EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT
Justice White changed his attitude and within four years was towing
the opposite line.36
In Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,3 7 a political candidate had
suffered the shortcomings of a robust press, having been the subject of
numerous articles critical of his candidacy.38 A Florida law permitted
political candidates the "right of reply" mandating that a paper must
publish the candidate's response to attacks on the candidate's per-
sonal character or official record, and the candidate sought to compel
the Miami Herald to print his reply.39 The Court majority, headed by
Chief Justice Burger, acknowledged the arguments that the "'market-
place of ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the
market" and consequently that "the only effective way to insure fair-
ness and accuracy and to provide for some accountability is for gov-
ernment to take affirmative action."40 The Court further considered
the arguments of certain academics, one of whom urged that "a lim-
ited right of access to the press could be safely enforced."41 Neverthe-
less, in holding for the Herald, the Court aptly noted that "'[h]owever
much validity may be found in these arguments, at each point the im-
plementation of a remedy ... necessarily calls for some mechanism,
either governmental or consensual."42 The necessity of a mechanism
for implementation was the problem, Chief Justice Burger reasoned,
and "governmental coercion" of the press "at once brings about a con-
frontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment[.] ''4 3
Justice White, concurring in a separate opinion, 44 ostensibly re-
canted his earlier statement.45 White stated that "the balance struck
by the First Amendment with respect to the press is that society must
take the risk that occasionally debate on vital matters will not be com-
prehensive and that all viewpoints may not be expressed .... ,,46 Jus-
tice White's notably laissez-faire opinion and contentedness to leave
speech to "market forces" was seemingly in conflict with his earlier
endorsement of government's role in breaking up the "monopoly. 47
Further, Justice White went on to find that "any other system that
would supplant private control of the press with the heavy hand of
36. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J. concurring).
37. Id. at 241 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 243.
39. Id. at 244.
40. Id. at 251.
41. Id. at 253.
42. Id. at 254.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
45. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
46. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
47. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
2009]
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government intrusion-would make the government the censor of
what the people may read and know,"' rejecting on the harshest
terms the government's role as the antitrust regulator of the market-
place of ideas but introducing its symbolism into the debate on free
speech.
iii. Buckley and the Rejection of "Relative Voices"
The Supreme Court again addressed the egalitarian reading, this
time within the context of the hot-button issue of campaign finance
reform, in the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.4 9 The Buckley
Court thus had to decide whether one or both of these provisions of-
fended the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. In its
decision, the majority opinion struck down the provision restricting
campaign expenditures as "necessarily reduc[ing] the quantity of ex-
pression by restricting the number of issues discussed.""° In contrast,
the Court upheld the donation restrictions, finding that they were less
a matter of speech as a donation "serves as a general expression of
support . . . but does not communicate the underlying basis for
support."51
In explicating its rationale, the Court then turned to the argument
that FECA's defenders had urged upon the Court that the act was
justified by three important interests, two of which implicated political
equality: equalizing the relative ability of all citizens to affect the out-
come of elections and opening the political system more widely to
candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.52
The majority considered but rejected that argument, stating that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment. '53
Over the many years since the decision, Buckley has been criticized
both by those who say it did not offer enough protection to speech54
and by those who say it offered too much. Proponents of campaign
finance reform for egalitarian reasons, in particular, have inveighed
48. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 48.
53. Id. at 48-49.
54. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663, 667 (1997).
55. See John C. Bonifaz, Gregory G. Luke & Brenda Wright, Challenging Buckley v. Valeo:
A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 58 (1999); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes,
Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1126 (1994).
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol31/iss2/3
EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT
against Buckley's "relative voice" statement, as the statement rejected
precisely what they believe is necessary to achieve political equality.56
Advocating that no tension existed between equality and First
Amendment principles prior to Buckley, Judge Skelly Wright states
that "paradoxically, by equating political spending with political
speech and according both the same constitutional protection, the
Court placed the First Amendment squarely in opposition to the dem-
ocratic ideal of political equality."57 By contrast, Professor Kathleen
Sullivan describes the choice as inherent in the facts of Buckley, stat-
ing that, "Buckley involved nothing less than a choice between two of
our most powerful traditions: equality in the realm of democratic pol-
ity, and liberty in the realm of political speech ... the Court in effect
chose a little of both."58 Yet, while the Court may have found some
shared ground between the two, it rejected the idea of compromising
the integrity of the First Amendment's guarantee for equality's sake.
59
The Buckley Court sent a clear message that the hand of the govern-
ment was not the mechanism for achieving political equality in speech.
That message would continue to be challenged by both the changing
composition of the Court and academics alike subsequent to Buckley.
iv. Subsequent Campaign Finance Reform Cases
Like Buckley, much of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
on the egalitarian reading has taken place in the context of campaign
finance reform. Between Buckley and the later case of McConnell,
6°
the Court often had occasion to consider whether laws aimed at mak-
ing elections "more democratic" passed the scrutiny of the First
Amendment.61 Not all of these cases can, nor need, be covered but a
few revived with increased fervor the debate over an equality-re-
stricted Speech Clause in the post-Buckley era.
56. See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); Bonifaz, supra note 55, at 58
("[Flew phrases in that decision have subdued subsequent prudential and legislative debate
more than the Court's famous dictum [on relative voices] . . . a survey of American political
philosophy and legal precedent reveal that this claim is overblown .
57. Wright, supra note 56.
58. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 667.
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
60. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
61. See generally Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 88 (1984);
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 780 (1984); Texas v. Johnson, 497
U.S. 397 (1984); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
2009]
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For instance, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce62 a non-
profit corporation challenged the constitutionality of a law barring the
use of corporate treasury funds for expenditures related to the en-
dorsement of or opposition to a political candidate's campaign.63 The
Court upheld the law against the constitutional challenge, noting that
the nature of corporations permitted the companies to "use 'resources
amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage
in the political marketplace.' "64 In other words, regulation of the per-
missible uses of economic resources in direct relation to political
speech, was necessary to ensure political equality.
Justice Scalia, dissenting from the majority opinion, conceded that
"perhaps the Michigan law before us here has an unqualifiedly noble
objective-to 'equalize' the political debate by preventing dispropor-
tionate expression. ' 65 Nevertheless, he remarked "the premise of our
Bill of Rights, however, is that there are some things-even some
seemingly desirable things-that government cannot be trusted to
do."'6 6 To Scalia, the First Amendment fits squarely within this con-
text, and he noted that "[t]he fundamental approach of the First
Amendment was to assume the worst, and to rule regulation of politi-
cal speech 'for fairness' sake' simply out of bounds., 67
The Court again approached the issue of equality and campaign fi-
nance in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,68 when a politi-
cal candidate and political action committee sought to enjoin the
enforcement of a contribution statute that they claimed violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.69 While the majority flatly re-
jected the candidate and PAC's claims on the basis of Buckley,7" Jus-
tice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, breathed life into the egalitarian
reading by attempting to recategorize Buckley. Referencing the "rela-
tive voice" statement of the Buckley Court, Breyer commented that
such language "cannot be taken literally."71 Breyer thus implied what
has been made explicit in his subsequent scholarship-that govern-
ment may permissibly serve as a referee of the relative voices of
citizens.
62. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
63. Id. at 654-55.
64. Id. at 659.
65. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 693.
68. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
69. Id. at 383.
70. Id. at 397.
71. Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Additional campaign finance reform cases and laws have been de-
cided and passed since Nixon.72 Although the cases have not squarely
addressed the issue of equality, the "fairness" rationale of the legisla-
tion is manifest73 and continues to be a central focus for legislators as
well as those in the academy.74 Absent any conclusive decisions by
the Supreme Court, the future of campaign finance reform is there-
fore likely to be rife with equality arguments confronting the central
First Amendment principle of political speech for decades to come.
That area is not the sole source of fodder for egalitarian arguments in
the free speech context, however, and in fact only serves as one of
many battlegrounds in the continuing clash between the competing
understandings of the Speech Clause-the one embodied by a laissez-
faire governmental posture towards the marketplace of ideas and the
one demanding government intervention and regulation. This larger
battle rages in Supreme Court decisions in various other First Amend-
ment areas75 as well as in the literature of the legal academy as many
professors attempt to debunk the plausibility of an unregulated
marketplace.
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Modern Equality Articulations
The core theoretical underpinning of "equality" interpretations to
the First Amendment concern a belief that the Constitution's infusion
with the values of "participatory self-government, '76 "reflective and
deliberative debate,' 77 or "public rights '78 necessitates interpreting
the First Amendment in the same way.7 9 These theories tend to place
72. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 127 S.Ct.
2652 (2007).
73. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H373 (Feb. 13, 2002) ("[L]arge sums of money drown out the
voice of the average voter.") (remarks of Rep. Langevin) (emphasis supplied).
74. See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 599 (2008).
75. For example, in the 2008 term, the Court's decision in Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n,
embodied this continuing clash of ideologies, the majority deciding that Idaho was not com-
pelled to subsidize the teaching union's speech and Justice Breyer's concurrence taking issue
with the distinction between "failing to promote" an individual's speech and "abridging" it.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
76. BREYER, supra note 1, at 46.
77. SUNST-ErN, ONE CASE, supra note 2, at 178.
78. Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights" First Amend-
ment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939 (2003).
79. A broader constitutional interpretive theory which, when imported into First Amend-
ment context, has an equal effect to the approaches described in the foregoing discussion is John
Hart Ely's "representation reinforcing" democracy. JoHrN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980) (arguing that government intervention in
political processes is necessitated when a systematic malfunction occurs and defining a system-
atic malfunction as "when the process is undeserving of trust.... [such as when] though no one is
actually denied a voice or vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systemati-
cally disadvantaging some minority .... ).
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a high value on democracy as the lens through which all other Consti-
tutional provisions are to be viewed."0 Moreover, the democracy of
which they speak is an egalitarian democracy, personified in the "one
person, one vote" scheme mandated by the Supreme Court in Reyn-
olds v. Simms.81 The democracy these theories allude to is assembled
out of phrases lifted from such places as the Preamble of the Constitu-
tion and hypothesizes that the three words, "We the People,"82 are an
interpretive mechanism for the balance of the document.
One incarnation of this theory is Cass Sunstein's "deliberative de-
mocracy."83 Deliberative democracy prizes political equality and
"seeks to promote, as a democratic goal, reflective and deliberative
debate about the possible course of action."84 Sunstein contends that
within the paradigm of deliberative democracy, "[g]overnment is cer-
tainly not permitted to regulate speech however it wants" but it "may
try to ensure diversity of view."85 In summary, "a well-functioning
democracy requires a degree of citizen participation, which requires a
degree of information; and large disparities in [political] equality are
damaging to democratic aspirations" and therefore legitimately regu-
lated by the government.8 6
What might be seen as a piggy-back on deliberative democracy is
current Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's "active liberty. 87
80. BREYER, supra note 1, at 7 (suggesting that the Constitution ought to be read "through
a more democratic lens."); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutional-
ism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 267 (2003) ("Treating the more recent
amendments as interpretive lenses for the older parts is justified by a meta-constitutional value
of democracy.").
81. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964); see also David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1994) ("[l]f equatiza-
tion is a legitimate (in fact mandatory) reason for rearranging voting rights, it is not clear why it
is an illegitimate reason for rearranging other rights to political participation.").
82. All of the theorists discussed below refer primarily to these three words in discussing
their interpretive theories. See SuNsTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 2, at 178 ("[T]he American free
speech tradition owes much of its origin and shape to a conception of democratic self govern-
ment ... symbolized by the transfer of sovereignty from the King to "We the People."); BREYER,
supra note 1, at 10. The text is an additional source of strength for advocates such as Frances R.
Hill. See Frances R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Citizen Sover-
eignty in Federal Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 155, 155-56 (2006). Interestingly, some
opponents of an egalitarian reading also root their argument in the Preamble and popular sover-
eignty. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform:
Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance "Reformers," 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 788 (2002)
("[T]he Constitution's Preamble makes plain what the Court has reiterated and what certain
'reformers' have neglected, that 'we the People of the United States' established and control this
government. Therefore, the people's right to speak out about issues and [political] candidates is
paramount.") (rejecting regulation of speech).
83. See SUNSrEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 2.
84. SUNSrEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 2, at 178.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 178-79.
87. See BREYER, supra note 1.
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Breyer's book of the same name concerns the "constitutional theme"
which informs his approach to our fundamental text, labeled the "peo-
ple's right to 'an active and constant participation in collective
power.' ,s With deference to this overarching theme of active liberty,
Breyer casts the First Amendment as "seeking to facilitate a conversa-
tion among ordinary citizens that will encourage their informed partic-
ipation on the electoral process." 9 Thus, "insofar as they achieve
these objectives" laws restricting a form of speech, like campaign fi-
nance reform, would be acceptable as they, "despite the limits they
impose, will help to further the kind of open public political discussion
that the First Amendment seeks to sustain, both as an end and as a
means of achieving a workable democracy." 9 A related but indepen-
dent strain of thought, articulated by a number of scholars and most
recently advanced by Professor Gregory Magarian is the public rights
reading of the First Amendment, which will be referred to as "collec-
tivism." Collectivists, like Magarian, describe the First Amendment as
not solely proscriptive but also exhortative, requiring more than a lais-
sez-faire policy from the government in regulating the marketplace of
ideas.91 This theory suggests that the "Free Speech Clause ... must
enable a political discourse aimed at reaching collective determination
of wise policy," electing that courts should have the role of
"evaluat[ing] asserted threats to and protections of expressive free-
dom based on their actual effects on the system of free expression." '92
The underlying value is that all viewpoints would be heard,93 and the
government acts as a referee in ensuring that this will be so-going so
far as to make the Speech Clause a "substantive" right requiring not
merely protection from "government denials [of] expressive free-
dom," but also government facilitation of "the public debate required
for self-government. 94
To the extent that these theories vary in the labels they invoke, their
foundational structure and philosophy is identical. After concluding
that the Constitution is a democratic instrument, they turn this conclu-
sion lose upon First Amendment construction. The sacrosanct value
of political equality effects a transmogrification of the Speech Clause
from an admonition against government interference in the exchange
of ideas to a limitless license and positive obligation to regulate the
88. BREYER, supra note 1, at 5.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 47.
91. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986);
Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
92. Magarian, supra note 77, at 1980, 1985-86.
93. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1948) ("What is essential is not
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.").
94. Magarian, supra note 77, at 1983 (emphasis supplied).
2009]
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marketplace so as to ensure that all views are not merely voiced but
heard.
III. THE APPEAL OF EQUALITY: ARGUMENTS ROOTED IN
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
To be fair, even the most expansive readings of the First Amend-
ment admit to limitations on the freedom of speech. Justice Brennan
wisely stated in Roth v. United States,95 that "[i]n light of this history, it
is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment
was not intended to protect every utterance."96 The egalitarian read-
ing thus offers one appealing reason for curtailing First Amendment
freedoms-that a supposedly greater interest is served by sacrificing
individual liberty in order to achieve a more perfect democracy and
better political deliberation. To evaluate its consistency with the First
Amendment, the basis of the egalitarian reading should then be ex-
amined. This discussion will first explore two of the best arguments
for the egalitarian reading: the antitrust metaphor and the analogy to
the "one person, one vote" principle of political equality.
A. An Antitrust for the Marketplace of Ideas
In a 1982 law review article on campaign finance and the First
Amendment, Judge Skelly Wright wrote that "the truth-producing ca-
pacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are allowed
to monopolize the marketplace ... just as proponents of the free mar-
ket system generally recognize the need for government policing...
by enforcement of antitrust laws, proponents of freedom of expression
must recognize the need for government policing[.]" 97 Although the
antitrust suggestion was directly aimed at campaign finance reform,98
the rationale can easily be extended to other areas of speech. 99
Though Judge Wright may have been first to expound upon the
Court's own imagery of monopolies by invoking the concept of anti-
trust, the argument has not been lost by subsequent egalitarian read-
ing commentators on both sides. For instance, Justice Stephen Breyer
picked up on the idea, noting that "just as a restraint of trade is some-
times lawful because it furthers, rather than restricts, competition, so a
restriction on speech, even when political speech is at issue, will some-
95. Roth v United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
96. Id. at 483.
97. Wright, supra note 56, at 636.
98. Id.
99. Antitrust, as a metaphor, is used within the broader realm of the marketplace of ideas
metaphor that permeates First Amendment jurisprudence.
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times prove reasonable, hence lawful."' '° Critics of the egalitarian
reading are also aware of the antitrust analogy, taking issue with its
zero-sum logic and stating that "it has long been a fundamental part of
the 'drowning out' argument popular in [campaign finance] reform
circles that some doors of communication must of necessity be closed
in order to open others."101
The repercussions of imposing the antitrust analogy on free speech
issues are obvious: mandatory government intervention of so-called
"market failures." The analogy requires that a judge must define what
market failures are and must correct them.0 2 Ultimately, this ability
corresponds to the duty that advocates of equality perceive judges to
have-the duty to promote deliberative democracy-and does not en-
tirely lack support in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of protecting
against the breakdowns of the democratic process, most candidly de-
scribed in the famous Caroline Products case, footnote number
four.'0 3
B. One Person, One Vote; One Person, One Voice
As with the antitrust analogy, Judge Skelly Wright was one of the
earliest to articulate that "[f]inancial inequalities pose a pervasive and
growing threat to the principle of 'one person, one vote,' and under-
mine the political proposition to which this nation is dedicated-that
all men are created equal."'' " The argument has been echoed by many
since. 0 5 Its core is that regulation of speech for equality purposes is
justified by analogy to voting, as both acts constitute an exercise of
political power.
Uniquely, the position rests, as some of its proponents readily ad-
mit, upon the principle that volume control, or "reducing the speech
of some to enhance the relative speech of others," is constitutionally
100. BREYER, supra note 1, at 48.
101. Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: The John Roberts Salvage Company: Af-
ter McConnell, a New Court Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 891, 909 (2007).
102. Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law Part II: Strict Scrutiny and Social
Choice: An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J.
1787, 1788 (1992) ("Representation-reinforcing process theories urge judges to rely on demo-
cratic political processes and intervene only when political market failure silences the voices of
particular interests or under-represented groups.").
103. United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (commenting,
though not holding, that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special con-
dition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.").
104. Wright, supra note 56, at 610.
105. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1994).
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justified.1 °6 The justification is found in the alleged constitutionality
of reapportionment. 10 7 Advocates see it as a natural extension; if the
government is required to give equal weight to all votes, the govern-
ment may not permit unequal political power in the arena of
speech. 108
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE EGALITARIAN READING
The egalitarian reading should be rejected for many reasons, only a
few of which will be detailed. Those which demand addressing in-
clude that free speech is a negative liberty relying upon government
non-intervention, that radical equality is not mandated by our republi-
can Constitution, and that it is inconsistent with the nature of negative
rights as absolutes. However, as a predicate and correlate to each of
these arguments, the foundation will be laid to show that the egalita-
rian reading is not supported by either the text or history of the First
Amendment.
A. Lack of Textual or Historical Justification
The text of the Constitution is oddly often sidelined (and sometimes
exiled) in much constitutional theory. Nonetheless, any defensible
theory on the interpretation of a constitutional provision must have
some basis in the text and history. The Constitution has legal status as
it was adopted by legal processes 1 9 and purports to be law. ° Any
interpretation must therefore begin, as with interpretation of a statute,
with the text'I' and inquire into history for contextual purposes where
ambiguity exists.112 The argument that the egalitarian reading mis-
construes the text and purpose of the First Amendment does not
stand alone but is instead the basis of the subsequent arguments.
Therefore, in order to give those arguments context, this proposition
will be expounded first.
106. Id. at 1382-84.
107. Id. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994); see also Wright, supra note 56, at 625-31.
108. See Sunstein, supra note 107.
109. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57, 110-16 (2d ed. 1994). Law is that which is
adopted by legal processes. See id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. VI (declaring that the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land").
111. See generally Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58
(1990) (stating statutory interpretation begins with text of statute).
112. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
145 (1990) ("If the Constitution is law, then presumably, like all other law, the meaning the
lawmakers intended is as binding upon judges as it is upon legislatures and executives.") (empha-
sis supplied).
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Many egalitarian reading proponents attempt to root themselves in
the text or history.'13 The problem is that this takes place not in the
text and history of the First Amendment, but in a broader history of
the Constitution.!1 4 Constitutional provisions can certainly inform
each other to the extent a phrase is repeated or used elsewhere, but
claiming that drafting history, federalist essays on other provisions and
the like should specifically inform the Speech Clause is a less credible
position. Additionally, ambiguity ought not to be read into a provi-
sion that is-at least in a few respects-unambiguous. The text of the
Speech Clause is unambiguous to the extent that it binds the govern-
ment's hands in making laws that abridge what can be legitimately
called "speech." This leads to the first argument against the egalita-
rian reading: the freedom of speech as a negative liberty.
B. Free Speech as a Negative Liberty: A Speaker-Centric First
Amendment
A fundamental flaw in the egalitarian reading is to view the Speech
Clause as a positive, rather than a negative, liberty. Casting the
Speech Clause as not merely proscriptive but exhortative requires the
assurance of a positive right, the promise of which is inconsistent with
the structure of the Bill of Rights as a list of negative liberties.' 5 A
"positive right is a claim to something ... while a negative right is a
right that something is not done."1" 6 Phrased differently, a negative
right is one which is or can be satisfied by the absence of government
action, whereas a positive right requires government action to be
satisfied. 17
The Bill of Rights, by and large, "confer[s] rights of protection from
rather than by the government,"'" 8 or negative rights. 119 As the Su-
preme Court has remarked, "the new powers granted to a central gov-
113. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 22-34.
114. Id.
115. The label of the Bill of Rights as a "charter of negative rather than positive liberties"
was first endowed by Judge Richard Posner in Jackson v. City of Joliet, although this understand-
ing is not recent and is supported by the language and history of the text. Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
116. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978).
117. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 857, 866 (2001)
("[T]he negative right is not dependent upon government in the sense that the obligation would
intrinsically satisfy the right.").
118. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 866
(1986) (emphasis in original). Although Currie's phrase references the Due Process clauses, the
phrasing is equally applicable to the whole text of the Bill of Rights.
119. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2273 (1990) (ac-
knowledging that "[tiraditionally, the protections of the Constitution have been viewed largely
as prohibitory constraints on the power of government, rather than affirmative duties with which
government must comply" though mounting a case to challenge the correctness of this view).
2009]
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ernment might be interpreted to permit the government to curtail
[various freedoms].... The amendments were offered to curtail and
restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Branches of government two years before in the original con-
stitution." ' The amendments are composed "not as shields around
particular actions, but as shields against particular rules."'' Thus,
"while the rights recognized in the Constitution are not perfectly neg-
ative, they are overwhelmingly oriented that way.' 1 22 The determina-
tion depends upon whether the language of a given clause is "phrased
as a prohibition, not an affirmative command.' '1 23
The First Amendment's Speech Clause is undoubtedly a govern-
ment conferral of negative liberty to the people. 24 The language of
the clause is phrased that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... ",125 A plain reading of the
text connotes negative liberty-a restriction of government's power to
legislate. As one commentator suggests:
The First Amendment does not provide that Congress shall pass such
laws as are necessary to promote informed debate, or assure vibrant
political competition, or promote political equality .... Rather, it says
that 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech' ...
the means chosen to fulfill the values and goals behind the Constitu-
tion was to prohibit government regulation of speech.' 26
Inevitably, the government cannot assure every speaker an audi-
ence. 12 The Speech Clause does not make this promise, either, but
instead promises an unregulated market for good or for ill.
The proscription against government action as the foundation of
free speech indicates a faith in the power of ideas to find their voices.
The equal capability of men to set up shop and sell their goods and
their freedom to enter the marketplace is essential, not their ability to
command the attention of passers-by. The value is placed upon their
merchandise and the assumption is that it will attract buyers based
upon its value, not upon the ubiquity of advertisements directing cus-
120. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (emphasis in original).
121. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitu-
tional Law, 97 MICH L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
122. Cross, supra note 114, at 873 (noting that a positive right exists, for instance, in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, though even the other Sixth Amendment rights are negative as
they proscribe the government from trying a criminal offense without a jury or from convicting
without permitting confrontation of accusers).
123. Currie, supra note 115, at 865.
124. See Sullivan, supra note 54, at 667 ("The norm in political speech is negative liberty:
freedom of exchange against a backdrop of unequal distribution of resources . .
125. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2.
126. Smith, supra note 100, at 906 (2007).
127. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 673 ("[P]olitical speakers generally have equal rights to be
free of government censorship, but not to command the attention of other listeners.").
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tomers to the shop. As the Supreme Court remarked in Dennis v.
United States, "the basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that
speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free de-
bate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies. ' 128 Faith
is also placed in the rationality of audiences and particularly that the
American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable
of considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and
its proximate and ultimate source. 129 The American people as con-
sumers are considered capable of "pick[ing] and choos[ing] what is
valuable, and [by] their aggregate decisions driv[ing] purveyors of
worthless goods (or information) out of the market."' 30
By contrast to these sacrosanct values of the Constitution, the egali-
tarian reading attempts to reverse the government's duty, resulting in
an obfuscating and untenable obligation. The Equality Clause
prescribes that the government ought to step in where voices receive
unequal airtime' or have a marked difficulty in procuring an audi-
ence.'32 The result is arbitrary interference and a power struggle over
determining who can speak and to what degree. In a word: censor-
ship. Politically, this leaves the incumbent governors with a definite
advantage over those of differing views, permitting politicians to "use
regulation to insulate the 'ins' from challenge by the outs."13 3 This is
anathema to the values of the First Amendment's Speech Clause and
antagonistic to its nature as a negative right-a promise against gov-
ernment interference.
C. Misconceiving the Nature of Our Republican Government
Another blow to the proponents of an egalitarian reading of the
Speech Clause is the fact that their arguments commence from a ver-
sion of popular sovereignty that is rooted in direct democracy and uni-
versal suffrage, whereas nothing of the sort can be found in our
Constitution as it was drafted.' 34 Although egalitarian reading propo-
128. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
129. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1582 (2007).
131. SUNSTErN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 4.
132. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC, supra note 3.
133. Smith, supra note 100, at 906-07.
134. The Constitution as it is now structured is more democratic than originally designed.
See, e.g., C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MAss DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVEN-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1995) (particularly pointed is Hoebeke's paraphrase of Senator Robert
Owen of Oklahoma calling the amendment process the "struggle of the people 'against dele-
gated government."'). Additionally, the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
increased popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, the government is still in nature Republican as it is
still one of delegated power. Considering "which Constitution" informs a reading of the First
Amendment, i.e. as drafted or as it currently reads, is an issue beyond the scope of this article.
20091
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nents "sometimes act and talk as if we had a direct democracy here in
the United States, "135 our government is republican in form. This is
confirmed by numerous textual provisions, including but not limited
to the Preamble, the original selection of senators from state senates,
and the Guarantee Clause, whereby the federal government assured
that state governments would maintain a republican form-implicitly
along the lines of the federal government's structuring of itself.136
Because the Constitution does not mandate an egalitarian distribu-
tion of political power, the egalitarian reading theorists cannot claim
that the Speech Clause should be read in light of this "theme." '137
Doubtless the American sovereign is the people themselves.1 38 Never-
theless, if radical political equality is not generally enshrined in the
Constitution, the only place to root it is in the voting jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Simms13 9 and Bush v. Gore.140 The
validity of these decisions has been called into question. 141 Further-
more, the principle they embody is not as easily transposed to speech
doctrine as supposed by some.142 First, whereas equality in voting
rights may be textually gathered without reference to the Preamble's
"We the People" phrase or other grandiose visions of popular sover-
eignty but directly from three amendments granting all adults equal
voting rights or the section of the Fourteenth Amendment which de-
cries unequal treatment, equality in speech cannot be so easily in-
ferred. It is one thing to say that the government may not exercise
laws so as to permit inequity in voting, which is an exercise of political
power with direct, certain, and meaningful consequences.143 It is a
135. John T. Valauri, Vladimir Putin, Campaign Finance Reform, and the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 577, 579 (2005).
136. Valauri, supra note 134, at 578.
137. BREYER, supra note 1, at 11-12.
138. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (2004) (commenting that at the time of the founding, "[t]he United States was then
the only country in the world with a government founded explicitly on the consent of its people,
given in a distinct and identifiable act...") ; Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republi-
can Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and The Denominator Problem, 65 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994) ("The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popu-
lar sovereignty. In a Republican Government, the people rule.").
139. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
140. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
141. BORK, supra note 111, at 90 ("[T]he one man, one vote doctrine was not only illegiti-
mate constitutional law, but a political failure as well"); Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in
Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 AKRON L. REV. 185, 192 (2002) ("[R]ather than
giving their considered judgment, the Justices were shooting from the hip on extremely difficult
legal issues."); Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 261, 296-297 (2005) (criticizing Bash v. Gore as essentially a racist decision).
142. Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance Reform,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 809 (2001); Sullivan, supra note 54, at 672-73.
143. Redish, supra note 141, at 783, 809; Sullivan, supra note 54, at 672-73. ("A vote is an act
with direct legal, non-expressive consequences.").
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separate proposal altogether to say that because individuals possess
different resources on their own that the government may compensate
for such inequality as it relates to their ability to speak, an exercise of
political influence with indirect, unpredictable, and possibly less
meaningful consequences.144
Moreover, reflecting again the distinction between positive and neg-
ative rights, superimposing a doctrine from the Equal Protection
Clause onto the Speech Clause requires at least some parallel struc-
ture, but no parallel exists. The Fourteenth Amendment, although not
granting an explicit positive right, nonetheless has an enforcement
clause by which Congress is encouraged to enact "appropriate legisla-
tion" to enforce its provisions and which the Supreme Court construes
to grant a power to adopt the measures enforcing the amendment's
guarantees.145 The First Amendment provides not for government en-
forcement but non-intervention. There is no parallel.
Finally, adhering to the requirement imposed by the analogy would
be untenable. Although reapportionment, which attempts to effect
perfect equality, is by no means an easily-manageable task; attempting
to equalize speech is even more problematic. Professor Martin Redish
summarizes the problems:
A logical extrapolation of the [voting] analogy would presumably
require each speaker to speak for the exact same period of time, for
anything more or less would of course destroy the equality that voting
is constitutionally required to achieve .... Moreover, if one really
wanted to impose a rigid, formalized equality analogous to the voting
structure, presumably one couldn't limit oneself to economic differ-
ences. Some speakers are louder or more articulate than others, and the
result of allowing such disparities to continue would be that some
speakers have more power and influence than others.1 4 6
Absolute equality in expression requires the government to impose
limitations on citizens which it is unable to accomplish, absent a pro-
gram to wipe out fundamental differences in people, all too reminis-
cent of 20th century science-fiction movies.
D. Derogability: Not in the Nature of Rights
An additional problem is that the egalitarian reading causes speech
rights to become derogable, no longer absolute in nature but "near
144. See, e.g., Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Diminishing Sphere of Political Speech: Implications of
an Overbearing Election Bureaucracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 189, 193 (2005) ("Each person
may have only one vote, but it has never been seriously suggested that the speech of each person
should be equally influential; otherwise, the views of politicians would have to be based solely on
opinion polls.").
145. U.S. CoNrs., Amend. XIV; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
146. Redish, supra note 139, at 809.
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absolute," relative to any other competing values which a legal battle's
protagonist subjects it and with which the Supreme Court agrees.147
Some may contest that the proposed consequence is problematic, but
most assuredly it is. A right is commonly referred to in philosophical
literature as a "trump.' 148  "Rights are, by definition, absolute, invio-
lable, and immune from balancing.' 1 49 They receive favored status
above ordinary rules and regulations. Where derogable, therefore, a
right is no right at all. The egalitarian reading is therefore anathema
to the very nature of free speech as a "right" under our Constitution's
Bill of Rights.
Of course it would be difficult to argue that, to guarantee free ex-
pression, the right to speech must be absolute. The concession has
already been granted that Justice Brennan was correct in wisely noting
that the absolutism and inclusiveness of the Speech Clause serves to
undermine any position which claims that free speech is absolute. 5 °
Nevertheless, the Speech Clause confers an absolute right, not abso-
lute in the inclusiveness of its scope but absolute in its non-dero-
gability, to be free from government abridgment of speech.
This argument does not rely upon the proposition that speech itself
is an absolute guarantee but rather on the notion that protected areas
that we can label as qualifying "speech," worthy of receiving protec-
tion, have absolute protection from "abridgment" or censorship.
Where it is alleged that the government improperly abridges speech,
the government should therefore only succeed when it establishes ei-
ther that they did not abridge the speech-for instance, where alterna-
tive avenues exist 151 or ideas themselves are not removed' 52 -or that
147. See Margarian, supra note 77; Bonifaz, supra note 55, at 59 ("The First Amendment
cannot protect speech rights to the exclusion of all other values.).
148. Ronald M. Dworkin, Rights as Trump, in THEORIES OF Rio-rs 153, 153 (Jeremy Wal-
dron ed., 1984) ("Rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for
political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole.").
149. Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
747, 770 (citing Dworkin, supra note 147, at 166).
150. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
151. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
("[E]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid pro-
vided ... that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion."). See also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792 (1984);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 322 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment embraces not only the freedom
to communicate particular ideas, but also the right to communicate them effectively. That right,
however, is not absolute - the communicative value of a well-placed bomb in the Capitol does
not entitle it to the protection of the First Amendment.").
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the expression is not speech but is instead conduct,153 intimately and
inseparably bound up with conduct,'154 or intellectually non-expressive
and utterly without redeeming social value. 55
First Amendment limitations, therefore, generally do not occur on
the basis of balancing interests and finding that some greater value
than speech ought to be given precedence, but rather on the basis that
what looks like speech is not actually speech, is inessential to the ex-
change of ideas, and other similar reasoning. Obscenity, for instance,
is not protected because it is considered as not in fact being speech.' 56
The Court has said that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance.. . have the full protection of the guaranties.., but
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of ob-
scenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."'157 This has
caused some to remark that "the premise is that obscenity may be
regulated not because it is dangerous, but because it is worthless."'51 8
Ideas that are worthless are rejected-they are not speech. Though it
must be conceded that a few areas fall outside of such easy black and
white distinctions1 59 or have not been justified on this basis by the
Court,1 60 those areas, it could be argued, are distortions of the Speech
Clause's principle and not in accordance with the original principle of
the text-but that is a different article. 161
Within the prescribed boundaries of defining what is protected
"speech," or what is permissible infringement and not abridgement,
152. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Far from be-
ing a case of 'one picture being worth a thousand words,' flag burning is the equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express
any particular idea, but to antagonize others.").
153. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("[Wjhen 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest In regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms.") (emphasis added).
154. Such is, for instance, the case with the doctrine of incitement. See, e.g., Debs, 249 U.S.
211; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
155. Examples include "fighting words," obscenity, and the like. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Roth, 354 U.S. 476; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
156. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
157. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
158. KALVEN, supra note 25.
159. A good example is the area of "strict scrutiny" where the court can find a compelling
interest which overcomes the First Amendment "interest." See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990).
160. For instance, in Roth, the Court's reasoning on obscenity-that it was not an idea-was
correct; it wasn't speech. Unfortunately, the Court qualified its "full protection of guaranties"
phrase with "unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests." Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
161. See generally Lee Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Non-
Originalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REv. 419 (2006); Gary Lawson, Mostly
Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007).
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all that is not carved out is absolutely protected. With the egalitarian
reading, this is not so. Rather, speech that does not fall within any
particular rationale for shedding constitutional protection is nonethe-
less taken outside of protection on the basis that it does not promote
democracy as well as another course, involving some infringement of
speech rights, could. The egalitarian reading's "solution" thus pro-
duces a value-laden, capricious standard that necessarily invokes a
balancing of interests, with the scope of the spectrum and weight of
each interest being defined by the judge. This takes speech out of the
realm of "rights"-no longer guaranteed, but subject to whatever
other compelling considerations five of nine jurists are moved by-
and is inconsistent with the nature of our fundamental guarantees.
V. CONCLUSION
An egalitarian reading of the First Amendment, though not yet a
standard interpretation, has been forcefully advanced by jurists and
theorists alike, finding its way into many important areas of the Su-
preme Court's own jurisprudence. The egalitarian reading should be
rejected as without foundation in the First Amendment's text and his-
tory. Were jurists to concede that political speech may be subordi-
nated for the purposes of a more perfect democracy, our democracy
would be destroyed as political incumbents would be invested with a
powerful instrument of tyranny. Protection of "discrete and insular
minorities" for the sake of all ideas being heard would marginalize
many viewpoints.
The First Amendment was created to combat just such a tyranny of
popular fashion. Its text rejects government intervention and places
faith in the power of the unregulated market, accepting its failings
over the graver consequences innate in permitting the government to
referee. The interest in "robust and open debate," unregulated,
should be defended. The health of our democracy relies upon it.
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